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Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-29-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a District 
Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment of conviction of any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for Theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 
as amended). (See Addendum A.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction against 
David E. Brown for Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). See Addendum A. A jury 
found Mr. Brown guilty following a trial on September 16, 1987, in 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, presiding. The Court sentenced 
Mr. Brown to a prison term of zero to five years with an 
accompanying fine of $5,000.00. The Court suspended the fine and 
the prison term and placed Mr. Brown on probation for a period of 
eighteen months. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
David E. Brown was arrested and charged with the July 28, 
1987, theft of a case of cigarettes valued at over $250.00 from the 
Farmer Jack's grocery store located at 20 East 900 South in Salt 
Lake City (R. 13). Mr. Brown pleaded not guilty to the third 
degree theft charge on August 21, 1987, and his case was set for 
trial on September 16, 1987, with a pretrial conference scheduled 
for September 11, 1987 (R. 15). 
Mr. Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude three prior 
convictions prior to the scheduled pretrial conference (R. 16-43). 
The motion was argued on September 11, 1987 (R. 154 at pp. 1-7) and 
taken under advisement by the court (R. 46). Prior to trial on 
September 16, 1987, the motion was renewed and the court denied the 
motion (R. 155 at pp. 3-15). The court indicated that the prior 
crimes of theft were crimes of dishonesty and they would be 
admissible because they were relevant to the credibility of Mr. 
Brown (R. 15). As a result of the trial court's ruling that the 
state could impeach Mr. Brown through the use of his three prior 
misdemeanor theft convictions, Mr. Brown did not testify (R. 14). 
Mr. Brown's trial lasted one day (R. 155). The evidence 
consisted of three witnesses who testified for the State that Mr. 
Brown was removing a case of cigarettes from the store when 
apprehended (R. 155 at 55-87). At least one of the witnesses 
acknowledged that at the time Mr. Brown was apprehended, he stated 
that he was not outside the store (R. 155 at 80). After the state 
rested, Mr. Brown moved to dismiss the charge but that motion was 
denied (R. 155 at p. 90). The court then instructed the jury and 
they retired to deliberate (R. 155 at p. 92). 
During the course of jury deliberations the jury foreman 
sent a note to the trial court (R. 87). The note stated, "Does 
statements made by jurors during recess that disturbed some members 
render our verdict invalid?" (R. 87, 155 at p. 92). The jury 
returned to the courtroom where the judge admonished the jurors to 
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decide the case solely on the law and the evidence presented in the 
courtroom (R. 155 at 93). The jury continued deliberations, 
Mr* Brown requested that the court inquire of the jurors 
whether the statements had to do with discussing the case. The 
court refused and then Mr. Brown moved for a mistrial (R. 155 at p. 
94). That motion for a mistrial was denied (R. 155 at p. 95). 
The jury returned and found Mr. Brown guilty of theft as 
charged in the information (R. 155 at p. 96). The trial court 
polled the jury and asked each juror the question, "was your verdict 
in this case influenced by anything other than the evidence 
presented in this courtroom and the law given you by the court?11 
(R. 155 at pp. 96-97). Each juror answered, No (Id.). 
A motion for a new trial was filed along with two 
affidavits detailing that Juror David Hogan had exhibited prejudice 
and a predisposed attitude of guilt towards Mr. Brown (R. 130-33, 
138-39). Mr. Hogan's display had occurred prior to jury 
deliberations during a recess in the proceedings (R. 87). The 
record is devoid of the usual admonitions required by Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-17(j) (1953 as amended). 
The motion for a new trial was also based on the 
affidavit of Juror Alan Blain (R. 138-39) which implied that Juror 
Hogan had failed to truthfully answer a voir dire question regarding 
his prior employment at a retail store. 
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial (R. 
152-53), and this appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Brown's three prior convictions for misdemeanor theft 
were not crimes of dishonesty or false statement and should have 
been excluded. The court erroneously denied his motion allowing 
their admission if he decided to testify. That decision effectively 
and prejudicially kept Mr. Brown from testifying in his own behalf. 
The failure of Juror Hogan to truthfully answer a voir 
dire question denied Mr. Brown his right to a fair trial and an 
impartial jury as guaranteed by both the state and federal 
constitutions. 
Mr. Brown's right to be tried by an impartial jury was 
violated when jurors engaged in pre-submission deliberations 
contrary to the constitutions of Utah and the United States. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
MR. BROWN'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
Prior to trial Mr. Brown moved the trial court to exclude 
his three prior theft convictions, all Class A Misdemeanors (R. 154, 
155 pp. 1-15). The trial court denied the motion finding that: 
Petty theft or shoplift, even though identical or 
similar crimes to the one for which the defendant is 
being tried, should be admitted and scrutinized very 
carefully by the trial court, are in fact crimes of 
dishonesty, and that the State will be permitted to 
question the defendant regarding conviction of those 
crimes, because they go to the very question of the 
credibility of the defendant (R. 155 at p. 15). 
The trial court committed error in ruling that thefts are crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules 
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of Evidence (1983). The trial court's error was prejudicial to Mr. 
Brown because the admission of the prior theft convictions, inasmuch 
as they were identical to the crime charged, strategically prevented 
Mr. Brown from taking the stand and testifying in his own defense.1 
On April 13, 1983, the Utah Supreme Court adopted new 
evidence rules, including Rule 609. The new rules were patterned 
after the federal rules of evidence and became effective in Utah 
courts on September 1, 1983. The committee! promulgating the new 
rules stated as their purpose to seek uniformity in the rules of 
evidence between the federal and Utah rules. Boyce, Utah Rules of 
Evidence 1983, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. The Utah Supreme Court agreed, 
stating that the adoption of the rules indicated a "fresh start" for 
the law of evidence in Utah. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 
(Utah 1986). The Court further instructed that the new rules were 
to be guided by federal case law for interpretations, and that the 
new rules would supplant all inconsistent rules and statutes. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1334 n. 40. 
Rule 609(a) is a verbatim repliba of the federal 
counterpart and speaks directly to the issue of impeachment by prior 
convictions. The Rule states: 
Rule 609. impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. (a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him o'r established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if 
1 Mr. Brown's case pre-dates the Utah Supreme Court's recent 
ruling in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987), 
holding prospectively that a defendant must take the stand to 
preserve this claim for appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Brown's claim 
is viable and properly presented before this Court. 
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the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law 
which he was convicted, and the court determines 
that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonest or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Subsection (2) of Rule 609(a) allows the admission of any prior 
conviction, regardless of the punishment, jJE the crime involved 
dishonesty or false statement. Subsection (1) of the rule allows 
the admission of felony convictions only after the court performs a 
balancing test of the probative value of the evidence as against its 
prejudicial effect to the accused. 
Mr. Brown's prior convictions are for misdemeanors and 
thereby subject to admission only under the subsection (2) theory. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet authored an opinion on the 
definition of "crimes of dishonesty or false statement" since having 
adopted the new rules.2 However, ample federal case law exists for 
guidance on the proper interpretation of "dishonesty" and "false 
statement." 
2
 This issue is currently before the Otah Supreme Court in State v. 
Bruce, Case No. 860325, (argued February 8, 1988). 
In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Court issued a 
per curiam opinion concluding that theft impliedly involves 
dishonesty. However, Cintron was decided under the old rules of 
evidence, Rule 21, and that position is contrary to the current 
direction and fresh start of the new rules. Moreover, Cintron is 
unsupported and remains inconsistent with the purpose of the current 
rules as well as case precedents. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 
1334 n.40, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that to the extent 
previous opinions are inconsistent with the new direction taken by 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, they should be overruled. Cintron is 
old law and should play no role in the decision now before this 
Court. 
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In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
which the Utah Supreme Court cited favorably in its recent 609(a)(1) 
State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the 
legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate 
which spawned the formulation of the rule* That court quoted the 
Conference Committee Report which stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the 
Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false pretense, or any 
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other 
offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the 
commission of which involves some element of deceit, 
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the 
accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d at 362 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News, pp. 7098, 7103). Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion 
discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that 
crimes of the type that Mr. Brown previously had been convicted of 
committing would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation. 
Id. at 362-63. 
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light 
on what Congress' intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2). In a 
statement from the court in United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior theft 
convictions of Mr. Brown, the court reasoned: 
Although it may be argued that any wilful violation 
of law . . . evinces a lack of character and a 
disregard for all legal duties, including the 
obligations of an oath, Congress has not accepted 
that expansive theory. 
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535 F.2d at 123. The intent of Congress was to limit the 
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to 
those crimes which bear directly on a witness' propensity to not 
tell the truth. Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in 
Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach. As the 
Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend 
to adopt such an expansive position. The prior theft convictions of 
Mr. Brown do not bear on his propensity to tell or not tell the 
truth; they show no deceit or dishonesty as meant by Congress. 
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of accompanying 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with the State to 
make such a showing. Generally, the court observed that crimes of 
violence, theft crimes (as in the case at bar), and crimes of 
stealth do not involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the 
proper meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction 
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully. The court stated that felony 
theft (prior convictions of theft in the case at bar) does not 
involve "dishonesty or false statement" of the 
credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2). 
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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The only Utah opinion discussing whether theft and 
burglary are crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the 
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) is Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion in 
State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, 
J. dissenting). While the majority in Morehouse does not address 
the Rule 609(a)(2) issue, the dissent in footnote 2, adopts the 
above described line of cases and remains the only authoritative 
discussion of the (a)(2) question by a Utah Court. Because Mr. 
Brown's prior misdemeanor convictions for shoplifting do not amount 
to crimes of dishonesty or false statement, the trial court erred in 
denying defense counsel's motion to suppress. 
The trial court's error in denying Mr. Brown's motion to 
suppress his prior convictions resulted in prejudice to Mr. Brown. 
The appropriate standard for review is whether "there was 'a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant'." State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038 (citations 
omitted). In Gentry, the Utah Supreme Court determined that there 
was "a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different had defendant's prior convictionis been excluded and had 
defendant taken the stand." Id. The Court pointed out that had 
Gentry taken the stand, he might have convinced the jury that the 
testimony of one of the witnesses was not true. In the instant 
case, the same reasoning is applicable; had Mr. Brown taken the 
stand, he might have been able to satisfactorily explain his actions 
or establish that details in the witnesses' testimony were incorrect. 
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However, because the court permitted the state to impeach his 
testimony through three identical convictions, Mr. Brown did not 
testify. 
In State v. Banner, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
that where the prior convictions are similar to those charged, the 
probative value of such convictions will rarely outweigh the 
prejudicial effect. Banner at 1334, n.44. In Banner, the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated: 
Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial effect 
is especially pertinent when the witness is the 
defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . This is 
particularly important when, as here, the prior 
conviction is for the same type of crime involved in 
the matter under present consideration. In this 
type of situation, the probative value of the 
evidence as affecting the party's credibility will 
rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the 
issues in dispute and the prejudice to the party. 
Banner at 1334 n. 44 (emphasis altered) (quoting Terry v. ZCMI, 605 
P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979)). 
Counsel for Mr. Brown repeatedly indicated the need to 
know, pre-trial, whether the prior convictions would be allowed so 
that she and Mr. Brown could determine if he would testify in his 
own behalf (R. 155 at pp. 11-14). When the trial court erroneously 
admitted the prior convictions as crimes of dishonesty going to 
credibility, Mr. Brown was prejudiced and felt he could not then 
take the stand. Accordingly, this Court should find reversible 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING MR. BROWNfS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT A JUROR FAILED TO 
TRUTHFULLY ANSWER A MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION. 
A. THE FAILURE OF A JUROR TO TRUTHFULLY ANSWER 
A MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION VIOLATED 
MR. BROWN'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee to every person accused of a crime the right 
to trial by an impartial jury. Additionally, the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments support this right to an impartial jury by 
mandating that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. These rights were denied Mr. 
Brown during his trial when Juror No. 17, David Hogan, failed to 
affirmatively respond to a voir dire inquiry of whether he had ever 
worked in retail sales (R. 155 at pp. 36-38). Juror Hogan 
exacerbated his failure to truthfully answer the query, and thus 
unveiled his error, when he later argued to fellow jurors this 
undiscovered retail sales experience (R. 138-39, Affidavit of Juror 
Alan Blain). See Addendum B. 
These events prejudiced Mr. Brown because without a 
truthful answer to the voir dire, Mr. Brown was unable to exercise a 
challenge for cause (or alternatively a peremptory challenge) of 
Juror Hogan. 
Once this information was discovered, Mr. Brown asserted 
to the trial court that his constitutionally guaranteed rights to an 
impartial jury had been violated, and he requested his conviction be 
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quashed and a new trial ordered (R. 130-31, 156 at pp. 3, 9-13). 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied that 
motion for a new trial (R. 152-53, 156 at pp. 30-31). 
In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 
548 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established the 
requirements for granting a new trial where a juror fails to answer 
voir dire questions. The McDonough Court held that before a new 
trial may be obtained because of a juror's failure to respond 
affirmatively to a voir dire question, the movant must demonstrate: 
(1) that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question, 
and (2) that a correct response would have provided a valid basis 
for a challenge for cause. Id. at 556. Several cases illustrate 
and extend this rule. 
In People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1984), a 
defendant on trial for assault with a deadly weapon discovered 
during the trial that a juror failed to disclose during voir dire 
that she had been assaulted at knife-point during an attempted 
rape. The trial court would not grant a mistrial or a new trial. 
On appeal the defendant claimed a denial of his right to an 
impartial and unbiased jury. The court reversed the conviction 
Where a party has examined the jurors concerning 
their qualifications during voir dire and any of 
them have failed to respond truthfully, it is 
manifest he has been deprived of his right to 
challenge for cause, and has been deceived into 
foregoing his right of peremptory challenge. 
. . . The denial of the right to reasonably 
exercise a peremptory challenge, be it by either the 
trial court or a juror through concealing material 
facts, is not a mere matter of procedure, but the 
deprivation of an absolute and substantial right 
historically designed as one of the chief safeguards 
of a defendant against an unlawful conviction. 
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Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 81. 
In United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1980), 
the federal court of appeals found that a juror's failure to 
affirmatively respond to a voir dire question regarding whether a 
close family relative had ever been convicted of a crime, when two 
family members had been convicted, violated the defendant's right to 
intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. 
Finally, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in People v. 
Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1980), observed that: 
[t]he failure of a juror during voi[r] dire to 
answer material questions truthfully, if discovered 
during a trial, may justify the removal of that 
juror and replacement with an alternate or may 
justify declaring a mistrial. If the lack of candor 
on the part of the juror is not discovered until 
after the trial, it may justify the granting of a 
new trial. A defendant has the right to exercise 
all of his peremptory challenges, and when a juror 
misrepresents or conceals material and relevant 
matters, that right, as well as the right to 
challenge for cause, is impaired. 
Id. at 903 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Borrelli court 
set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial expressly because 
the defendant's right to make an intelligent decision regarding 
whether to challenge for cause, use a peremptory, or accept a juror 
had been denied. Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court asked several times 
whether any of the jurors had ever worked in the retail sales 
business (R. 155 at pp. 36-38). See Addendum C. Juror Hogan 
remained silent. Id. Yet, once impaneled and deliberating as a 
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juror he referred the other jurors to previous experiences he had 
while employed in a retail store (R. 138-39, Affidavit of Juror Alan 
Blain). See Addendum B. 
The crime charged against Mr, Brown was Retail Theft. 
Accordingly, the questioning as to whether anyone had ever worked in 
a retail store of any kind was material. An affirmative answer to 
the question (or to any of the followup questions), would have been 
grounds upon which a challenge for cause, or a peremptory challenge, 
or at the very least further questioning could have been made so 
that those choices could have been intelligently considered and 
acted upon. 
When Juror Hogan remained silent, as the case law 
indicates, Mr. Brown's constitutionally protected rights to an 
impartial jury and a fair trial were denied him. The failure of the 
trial court to adhere to the federal constitution and grant a new 
trial was prejudicial error. Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
the conviction and remand for a new trial. 
B. THE FAILURE OF A JUROR TO TRUTHFULLY ANSWER A 
MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION VIOLATED MR. BROWNfS 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
explicitly assures that the criminally accused shall have the right 
to a trial by an impartial jury. Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah requires that ff[n]o person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
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While Utah has not specifically addressed the state 
constitutional issue, it is fair to conclude that Utah's protections 
extend at least as far as the federal constitution does since the 
language of the two constitutions are similar. Accordingly, Mr. 
Brown adopts the arguments of subpoint "A" of this point as equally 
persuasive for Utah's constitutional interpretation. 
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court examined the issue of incidental contact during the 
trial between witnesses and jurors. The Court pointed out that both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee trial by an 
impartial jury. Yet, while some jurisdictions hold that 
conversations between jurors and witnesses are not fatal flaws in 
the process unless the defendant can show actual prejudice resulted, 
our Supreme Court has established greater protections for the right 
to an impartial jury by enunciating "a more stringent rule in 
recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it 
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may 
not, himself, be able to recognize that fact." Pike at 279-80. 
Accord State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987). The Utah 
Supreme Court has placed the burden on the prosecution, not the 
defendant, and the presumption is one of prejudice. Id. 
By analogy, Mr. Brown asserts that the Utah Constitution 
extends even greater protection into the area of jurors failing to 
honestly answer voir dire questions. As this question again is one 
of jury impartiality, the presumption ought again to be one of 
prejudice as in Pike. 
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Still additional support buttresses Mr. Brown's claim. 
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines the reasons 
for which a juror may be challenged for cause. The Rules states in 
pertinent part: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the 
juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-18(e)(14) (1953 as amended). Had Juror Hogan 
answered the voir dire question truthfully he very well may have fit 
within this subsection allowing dismissal for cause. At the very 
least, a truthful answer from Juror Hogan would have allowed 
follow-up questioning which might have either clarified a challenge 
for cause or allowed Mr. Brown his protected right to utilize a 
peremptory challenge. 
Inasmuch as Juror Hogan did not truthfully answer a 
material voir dire question put to him by the trial court, Mr. Brown 
was denied his right to an impartial jury under the Utah 
Constitution. The trial court therefore erred in failing to grant 
the requested motion for a new trial. Accordingly, this Court 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING MR. BROWN'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL AND 
NEW TRIAL WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT JURORS 
DELIBERATED BEFORE THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO THEM. 
A. THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. BROWN'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution combine to assure that each and every criminal 
defendant is afforded the right to have his case tried before an 
impartial jury. Whenever jurors begin deliberations prior to the 
end of trial the constitutional guarantees of an impartial jury are 
violated. In addition to the presubmission deliberations, the trial 
court erred in failing to admonish the jury not to discuss the case 
among themselves prior to its being submitted to them for 
deliberation. 
Shortly after the trial court submitted the case to the 
jury for deliberation, the jury sent a note to the court which read, 
"Does statements made by jurors during recess that disturbed some 
members render our verdict invalid?" (R. 155 at p. 92). The trial 
court had the jury returned to the courtroom and admonished them to 
decide the case solely on the law given by the court and on the 
evidence presented (R. 155 at pp. 92-93). The jury was then 
returned to the jury room to deliberate further. 
Mr. Brown moved the trial court to make an inquiry into 
the pre-submission deliberations and for a mistrial when the court 
refused to inquire in the pre-submission statements (R. 155 at pp. 
93-94). The trial court denied the motions (R. 155 at p. 95). The 
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jury subsequently returned with a verdict of guilty (R. 155 at 96). 
Mr. Brown later filed a motion for a new trial (R. 130-31), and then 
orally argued before the trial court (R. 156 at pp. 3-4, 11-23). 
Mr. Brown supported his motion with affidavits alleging 
that jurors had conversed among themselves and that Juror Hogan had 
made prejudicial statements against the defendant during a recess 
before the close of the case (R. 132-33, 138-39). The affidavit of 
Juror Blain alleges, inter alia, that "statements were made during a 
recess that created an atmosphere of prejudice against defendant." 
(R. 138-9). The affidavit alleged specifically that a woman juror 
commented that the defense attorney did not appear worried and that 
Juror Hogan responded, "Well, that guy doesn't matter," and referred 
to him as "that black man." (R. 138-39). Additionally, the record 
reflects a concern regarding a "Book 'em Danno" comment and 
statements and attitudes of Juror Hogan who appeared to have 
predetermined the defendant's guilt (R. 156 at p. 7, 138-39). 
In State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Conn. 1980), 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut expressed that "[djeliberations may 
commence only after all the evidence has been presented, final 
arguments of counsel have been made, and the trial court has charged 
the jury on the law." After detailing the pitfalls of premature 
deliberations, the Washington court found constitutional violations 
of both a due process nature and the right to an impartial jury 
where the trial court had permitted jurors to deliberate early. Id. 
at 1147. 
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In Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390, 1392 (8th Cir. 
1969), the court held that the judge's failure to admonish the jury 
not to discuss the case before it was submitted to them was harmless 
error where the trial was completed in one day and the jury did not 
actually discuss the case prior to submission. Ij3. at 1391. The 
instant case is distinguishable since the jury discussed the case 
prior to submission. Hence, the trial court's error in failing to 
admonish the jury was not harmless. 
Furthermore, in United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744 
(8th Cir. 1980), the same court acknowledged that ff[i]t is essential 
to a fair trial, civil or criminal, that a jury be cautioned as to 
permissible conduct and conversations outside the jury room." Id. 
at 745-6. The Williams court indicates a willingness to presume 
prejudice where the trial court fails to admonish jurors before they 
separate overnight. Id. at 746. Although the trial in the instant 
case lasted only one day, the trial court's failure to admonish 
resulted in the case being discussed prior to submission. 
People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 
1984) carried the Williams theory a step further. The Diaz court 
states that "a presumption of prejudice arises from any jury 
misconduct.ff Diaz at 82. The Court conceded the presumption is a 
rebuttable presumption but cautioned that: 
[i]n determining whether the presumption of 
prejudice has been rebutted, it is clear that the 
usual harmless error tests for determining the 
prejudicial effect of an error are inapplicable. 
Convincing evidence of guilt does not deprive a 
defendant of the right to a fair trial since a fair 
trial includes among other things the right to an 
unbiased jury. . . 
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Diaz at 82 (citations omitted; emphasis deleted). 
In the case at bar Mr. Brown's constitutional rights were 
violated by Juror Hogan's pre-submission deliberations and his 
pre-disposed attitude of guilt toward the accused. The comments 
and/or attitude were significant enough that the jurors asked the 
trial court whether their deliberations would be invalidated (R. 155 
at p. 92). The trial court's refusal to inquire into the nature of 
the "disturbing statements" further intensified the violation of 
Mr. Brown's rights as did the trial court's ultimate finding of 
harmless error (R. 156 at pp. 18-22, 30-31). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 
B. THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. BROWN'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
are similar to the due process and impartial jury provisions in the 
federal constitution. The Utah rights are at least as persuasive as 
the federal counterparts and occasionally may surpass them. See 
generally State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); and State v. Early 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). As 
presented in Point II, the question of jury impartiality is an area 
where the Utah Supreme Court has surpassed the federal protections 
and presumes prejudice under certain circumstances. Pike, 712 P.2d 
at 279-81. 
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The early deliberation question is also an issue which 
implicates the right to be tried by an impartial jury and is an area 
which the Utah Constitution should extend to protect. As when 
jurors are seen speaking with witnesses (Pike), and when jurors fail 
to truthfully answer voir dire questions (Point II, supra), the Utah 
Constitution must presume prejudice when jurors engage in 
pre-submission deliberations as occurred in this case. 
Support for this argument is found in the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 17(j) which reads: 
At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are 
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall 
be admonished by the court that it is their duty not 
to converse among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other 
person or any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
Utah Code Ann. S77-35-17(j) (1953 as amended); see also Utah Code 
Ann. §77-17-11 (1953 as amended). The trial court and the jurors 
violated Rule 17(j) in this case. The trial court failed to 
admonish the jurors during breaks (R. 155 at 87) and at lunch 
(R. 155 at p. 54). 
Because the trial court did not admonish them, the 
jurors, in particular Juror Hogan, violated the rule. 
The jurors themselves suspected that something was amiss 
when they wrote the note inquiring as to the validity of their 
decision after "some disturbing statements" had been made prior to 
deliberations (R. 155 at p. 92). The trial court's admonishment was 
then too late; the prejudice of early deliberations had already 
- 21 -
occurred. The trial court erred in failing to inquire as to what 
occurred, in failing to grant the motion for mistrial, and in 
failing to grant the motion for a new trial. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand this 
case to the trial court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Brown 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for theft and remand 
this case to the trial court with an order for either a dismissal of 
the charges or a new trial. 
DATED this / day of May, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
^ JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, t_>y] „---""" ' (COMMITMENT) 
Case No. CJldl-lcz^ 
Clerk ^JnrrsH u r H U - ^ -
Reporter g ^ t ^ O -
Bailiff 4 T L U W 
Defendant. Date 10^2*3'&7 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; A plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of f ^ k r , a felony 
of the %rrX degree^a a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented hy*4 l i w & r j c ^ and the State being represented hy K l H ^ ^ V ^ y ^ - i s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: U 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
^knot to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; c r7> oO 
\ d and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 5 6 0 0 • 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• w*& f i 
Js Defendant is granted a stay of the above (^prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 1 L) fVxcv^Tvv>^
 t pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
• Commitment shall issue 
DATED this ^ 3 day of ( Y^ke 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ._ ^ _ __. 
DISTRICT^OURTJUU^E 
. \ ' i T 
Defense Counsel ~* 0 » / O N nnv 'OLEY 
C I r — f S^mdS^L^ Deputy County Attorney / \ pJSage ^ ~ ~ - of 
U n - l n H n o i /Vollftui— lail/Pn«nn/APAPA /Pink—n«fpn«te\ (dniA o n; 
Judgment/State v. worm— VCR i £ m Honorable • ^ i 






Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
Serve ^rtX »VUVC< Wv /-
in the Salt Lake County Jail r.nmmpndng tAffW . I X t f U ' f f a y - " " t r r * ^ ^ r v ^ M 
Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation a 




Pay restitution in the amount of $ 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any I v V 
_; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
; or • at a rate to be determined by 
n aftc 
i2J2lki^==^program, counseling, or treatment as 

















directed by the Department of Adult Probatio
Enter, participate in, and complete the 
Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or {^vocational training £sas directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; ™»n'wiih r*f~PV€V^- 6 ^ f l ^ ^ ^ 
Participate in and complete any training a as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
Submit to drug test ing.- a& h&yk Z ' ^ v u ^ -#vr V v e e J o ^ 
Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
Take antabuse • as directed by the Department^o{ Adult Probatiop $nd Parole. 
Obtain and maintair 
Maintain full-time er 
Obtain and maintain full-time employment or Tuii-time'^chooiing. 
Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with _ , 
Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of. 
Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on 
i  ir t   t  rt t f lt r ti n a  r l  
n full-time employment. C4& K^s #/ \AJCLMJ V 
smployment. tfl&r\h*d H + v ^ r o t ^ ^ ^ i v ^ / p l c ^ ^ J 
i  f ll-ti  l y t r full-ti e'sc li . ^ 
days in jail. 
. for a review of this sentence 
l<t>,\ng*o 'McucU ^Q ; W H & ^COLW—. 
v 
DATED this 23
 day of M s M x ^ 
Page of 
DISTRICT COUfTTJUDGE 
< ' '. ' i »" 
H. D'-rrON hnvDLEY 
ADDENDUM B 
w — , • .n, . r e^^.tl CLERK'S OFFICE 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS ( #250fc J* \ U * ^ ] ^ ^ ^ L * Countv Utah 




SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THEfevTJH«ir^rTjDIC]B?£,U DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID E. BROWN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. CR87-1029 
HONORABLE PAT BRIAN 
I, -MrE&n BLAZHE, being first duly sworn according to law 
on my oath depose and say: 
1. That I was one of the jurors in the trial on the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. That during a recess, prior to deliberation, 
statements were made during a recess that created an atmosphere of 
prejudice against defendant. One woman commented that the defense 
attorney did not appear worried and Mr. Dave Hogan responded, "Well, 
that guy doesn't matter." Further, Mr. Hogan referred to him as 
"that black man.11 
3. That such statements were made after the court 
admonished the jurors to not discuss the case prior to deliberations 
4. Mr. David Hogan's statements and attitude were such 
that he appeared to have pre-determined defendant's guilt. When I 
J&nz. of kh** J urorj fl£ 
advised JUJ^KC; that I would hate to be on trial to this jury, 
jeanine Cobb agreed with me. 
0001'} 8 
5. The foreperson of the jury/ Marilyn Williams, was 
also concerned regarding statements and a note was sent to the court 
requesting how to proceed. 
6. Further/ Mr. David Hoganf in discussing the case 
during deliberations/ referred to experiences in his previous 
employment in a retail store. 
DATED this /^jj^7day of October/ 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this G97il day of 
October, 1987. 
IOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
/ - / & - ! & 
DELIVERED BY 
OCT 1 3 1987 
0. LOYOLA 
000!,?9 
1 JUROR NO, 13: Uh-huh (affirmative), 
2 THE COURT: Did that experience in any way adversely 
3 affect you so that you could not be fair and impartial if 
4 selected as a juror today? 
5 JUROR NO, 13: No, sir. 
6 THE COURT: Anyone else had prior jury experience, 
7 civil or criminal? 
8 (No response.) 
9 THE COURT: Have any of you ever worked directly or 
10 indirectly in the retail sales business? 
11 JUROR NO. 25: Marvin Bacon. I was a security 
12 manager for Sears Roebuck for about eleven years. 
13 THE COURT: When did you conclude your last day of 
14 work as a security officer? 
15 JUROR NO. 25: 1966. I have been a peace officer 
16 for Salt Lake City and for the State of Utah. 
17 THE COURT: Would those experiences prevent you 
18 from being fair and impartial if selected as a juror in this 
19 case? 
20 JUROR NO. 25: No. 
21 THE COURT: Anyone else in the retail? 
22 JUROR NO. 3: I worked in college, for Sears, also, 
23 1968 to 1972. It wouldn't bias me. 
24 THE COURT: Anyone else who has been involved in 







































23: Wanda Pelton. I worked for ZCMI in 
Would that experience in any way prevent 
and impartial if selected as a juror in 
23: No. 
24: When I was in high school I worked at 
. Chris and Company. That was 40 years ago. 
THE COURT: Would that prevent you from being fair 




6: Five years ago for about six months I 




In retail sales? 
6: Yes. 
That's the chocolate manufacturing 









Would that affect your impartiality in 
6: No. 
11: I worked at Auerbach's just as they 
closing out their store. 
THE COURT: 
JUROR NO. 
What was your last date of employment? 
11: It was when Auerbach's closed, about 
37 
1 five years ago, 
2 THE COURT-. Would that: work experience affect your 
3 impartiality if selected as a juror? 
4 JUROR NO. 11: No, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Anyone else? 
6 (No response.) 
7 THE COURT: Do any of you have relatives or close 
8 friends who have served as a security officer in a retail 
9 sales business? 
10 JUROR NO. 14: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: Please. 
12 JUROR NO. 14: A cousin who was a security guard for 
13 J. C. Penney1s Company. I am Marlowe Gwynn. The last I knew 
14 he was working there was about five years ago. 
15 THE COURT: Would that relationship predispose you 
16 to give more weight to security officers1 testimony than to 
17 any other witnesses? 
18 JUROR NO. 14: No. 
19 THE COURT: Or to cause you to be biased or 
20 prejudiced in any way? 
21 JUROR NO. 14: No. 
22 THE COURT: Would any of you give the testimony of a 
23 police officer greater weight than any other witness by virtue 
24 of the fact that he is a police officer? Do you understand 
25 that in determining what weight to give to any witness you 
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